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Abstract: Even if I think it very likely that some morally good act is supereroga-
tory rather than obligatory, I may nonetheless be rationally required to perform
that act. This claim follows from an apparently straightforward dominance argu-
ment, which parallels JacobRoss’s argument for ‘rejecting’moral nihilism. These
arguments face analogous pairs of objections that illustrate general challenges for
dominance reasoning under normative uncertainty, but (I argue) these objections
can be largely overcome. This has practical consequences for the ethics of philan-
thropy – in particular, it means that donors are often rationally required to max-
imize the positive impact of their donations.
1. Introduction
Suppose I am faced with a choice whether to spend $500 on a new TV or do-
nate the money to GiveDirectly. I am sure that donating the money is either
morally obligatory or supererogatory, but unsure which. Conversely, I am
sure that buying the new TV is either morally prohibited or merely permis-
sible, but unsure which.
The central thesis of this article is that, on most plausible ways of spelling
out the details of this case, I am rationally required to donate my $500 to
GiveDirectly. The argument for this claim is straightforward: because do-
nating to charity is certainly at least as good as, and possibly better than,
buying the TV, the former option statewise dominates the latter. Or, put
more simply, buying the TV carries risk, namely the risk of violating amoral
obligation, while donating toGiveDirectly carries no such risk – and indeed,
as I will argue, no risk of acting contrary to one’s all-things-considered
reasons.1
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This argument borrows its pattern from an argument given by JacobRoss
(2006b). Ross argues that it is always rational to ‘reject’ (meaning, to ignore
for purposes of practical deliberation) ‘absolutely deflationary’ theories like
nihilism according to which it is never the case that one practical option is
more choiceworthy than another, so long as one has positive credence in
an ordinary moral theory like Kantianism or utilitarianism, since under
moral uncertainty, dominance reasoning will always recommend the course
of action preferred by the non-deflationary portion of one’s credal distribu-
tion. So in §2wewill beginwith an examination ofRoss’s argument, focusing
on two objections that, as we will see, potentially generalize to other applica-
tions of dominance reasoning under moral uncertainty. §3 then turns to
supererogation. The dominance argument for rejecting supererogationism
succeeds only when a supererogatory option is at least as choiceworthy, all
things considered, as its merely permissible alternatives, and in this section
I argue both that many ordinary cases of supererogation seem to satisfy this
condition and that the most plausible theoretical understandings of superer-
ogation allow it to be satisfied. §4 then examines analogues of the two
objections to Ross’s anti-nihilistic argument that arise in the case of superer-
ogation, and argues that these objections are on balance less threatening in
the latter context. §5 draws out some practical implications of rejecting
supererogationism for the ethics of philanthropy, arguing in particular that,
in most cases where I judge that I am certainly at least permitted to donate a
particular sum of money, I am rationally required to maximize the expected
value of my donation. §6 is the conclusion.
2. Moral nihilism
Ross argues that we may almost always disregard what he calls ‘absolutely
deflationary’ ethical theories according to which it’s never the case that
one course of action is more choiceworthy than another, whatever our cre-
dence in such theories.2 He distinguishes, within this class, between ‘uni-
form’ theories according to which any pair of options is equally
choiceworthy and ‘nihilistic’ theories according to which ‘the notions of
good and bad and of right and wrong are illusions and… objectively speak-
ing, no option or state of affairs is better than any other, nor are any two
options or states of affairs equally good’ (Ross, 2006b, p. 748).
Nihilism presents the more difficult and interesting case for Ross’s domi-
nance argument, so it is here that I will focus. Ross imagines a case in which
he is nearly certain that moral nihilism is true and finds himself faced with a
trolley dilemma. In such circumstances, he claims, he may simply disregard
his credence in nihilism for purposes of practical deliberation. He supports
this claim by the following argument.
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[S]uppose…that I have a degree of credence of .01 in TL [a non-nihilistic moral theory that
prescribes turning the trolley to the left], but…I have a degree of credence of .99 in a nihil-
istic theory TN. And again suppose that I must decide between sending the trolley to the
right and sending it to the left. In this case we could reason as follows. According to TL,
it would be better for me to send the trolley to the left than to send it to the right. And
so my credence in TL gives me pro tanto subjective reason to send the trolley to the left.
The only way this could fail to be the most rational option would be if my credence in
TN gave me a sufficiently strong reason to send the trolley to the right. But TN implies that
there would be nothing valuable or disvaluable about either alternative. And so my credence
in TN gives me no subjective reason to favor either alternative. Hence the pro tanto subjec-
tive reason to send the trolley to the left is unopposed, and so this is the rational option.
(Ross, 2006b, p. 748)
This line of reasoning seems straightforward, but it faces at least two sig-
nificant objections.
2.1. THE CYCLICITY PROBLEM
MacAskill (2013) offers the most careful analysis to date of dominance rea-
soning under moral uncertainty. In formalizing Ross’s argument, he initially
attributes to Ross the following principle.
Dominance over Theories (DoT) – If some theories in which you have credence give you
subjective reason to choose x over y, and no theories in which you have credence give you
subjective reason to choose y over x, then, rationally, you should choose x over y. (MacAskill,
2013, p. 511)
DoT seems plausible on face, but MacAskill shows that it is subject to an
extremely powerful objection: for an agent who has positive credence in one
or more non-nihilistic theories that posit incomparability, i.e. that generate
an incomplete ranking of options, DoT can generate preference cycles.
The demonstration of this result depends on a pair of complicated thought
experiments. Stated schematically, and leaving aside the details MacAskill
offers to illustrate the schema, the simpler of the two thought experiments
goes like this: Agent A has three optionsO, P, andQ, and divides her moral
beliefs among three theories, T1, T2, and T3. T1 implies thatO is better than
P and thatQ is incomparable to both. T2 implies that P is better thanQ and
that O is incomparable to both. And T3 implies that Q is better than O and
that P is incomparable to both. Hence, by DoT,O ≻ P ≻Q ≻O (MacAskill,
2013, pp. 513–4).
To avoid cyclicity, then, we must limit ourselves to dominance principles
whose conditions of application exclude incomparability. In particular,
MacAskill replaces DoT with what he calls
Genuine Dominance over Theories (GDoT) – If some theories in which you have credence give
you subjective reason to choose x over y, and all other theories in which you have credence give
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you equal subjective reason to choose x as to choose y, then, rationally, you should choose x over
y. (MacAskill, 2013, p. 518)
But this weaker principle is bad news for Ross’s argument, since nihilistic
theories, as Ross has characterized them, do not claim that we have
equal subjective reason to choose either option from any pair, but deny
that notions like value, choiceworthiness, and subjective reasons are
meaningful and hence that any comparisons in terms of these notions,
even comparisons of equality, can meaningfully be made. Thus,
MacAskill concludes that dominance reasoning cannot justify rejecting
nihilism.
It seems to me, however, that there is a relatively straightforward escape
from the cyclicity problem, and that Ross has simply made a very inconve-
nient mistake by treating equality as a positive value relation, such that ni-
hilistic theories deny that any two things are equally good. Consider by
contrast John Broome’s proposed definition of equality with respect to a
property F: ‘“x is equally as F as y” means that [i] x is not Fer than y,
and [ii] y is not Fer than x, and [iii] anything that is Fer than y is also
Fer than x, and [iv] y is Fer than anything x is Fer than’ (Broome, 1997,
p. 72). If nihilism is true, then all four clauses in Broome’s definition are
trivially satisfied for any x and y and any evaluative property F (e.g.
‘good,’ ‘right,’ ‘choiceworthy,’ ‘supported by objective/subjective
reasons’): if nothing is better than anything else, then x is not better than
y, y is not better than x, and since neither x nor y is better than anything,
it is vacuously true that for anything either x or y is better than, the other is
better as well. Furthermore, by virtue of these last two clauses, Broome’s
definition distinguishes (as Broome intends it to) between equality and
other relations like parity and incomparability in the context of non-
nihilistic theories.
Thus, we can strengthen MacAskill’s GDoT by simply replacing the pos-
itive relation of equality, which nihilistic theories decline to attribute to any
pair of options, with Broome’s negative relation. (Let’s call the latter ‘equal-
ity*,’ for ease of reference.)
Strengthened Genuine Dominance over Theories (GDoT*) – If some theories in which you have
credence give you subjective reason to choose x over y, and all other theories in which you have
credence give you equal* subjective reason to choose x as to choose y, then, rationally, you
should choose x over y.
GDoT* allows Ross’s anti-nihilistic argument to go through, while remain-
ing immune to the preference cycles brought on by the incautious principle
DoT: in MacAskill’s case described above, T1 does not imply that there is
equal* subjective reason to choose O as to choose Q, since there is greater
subjective reason to choose O than to choose P but not greater subjective
reason to choose Q than to choose P, nor is there equal* subjective reason
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to choose P as to choose Q, by precisely the same reasoning (and likewise,
mutatis mutandis, for T2 and T3).
Thus, the dominance argument for rejecting nihilism can escape the threat
of cyclicity. However, as we will see in §4.1, MacAskill’s problem does reap-
pear as a challenge to the dominance argument for rejecting
supererogationism, somewhat constraining the scope of that argument.
2.2. NIHILISTIC UNDERMINING
There is another difficulty that strikes me as more worrisome for Ross’s
argument and which has yet to receive substantial attention in the literature.
This is the worry that principles like DoT, GDoT*, and any other domi-
nance principle to which Ross’s argument might appeal seem to be
undermined by the very same nihilistic hypotheses that the argument is
meant to justify rejecting – or at least, by some of those hypotheses.
Consider a form of nihilism I will callDemocritean normative error theory
(DNET). According to this view, only fundamental entities exist
(flatworldism3) and all fundamental entities are physical (physicalism).
‘Reasons,’ ‘obligations,’ ‘goods,’ ‘values,’ etc., are not fundamental physical
entities, so no reasons, obligations, goods, values, etc. exist. For any norma-
tive/evaluative proposition to be true, at least one such entity must exist to
serve as its truthmaker. Therefore, DNET holds, no normative/evaluative
propositions are true.4
Is such an extreme view plausible? Though I don’t assign it the greater part
of my own credence, it seems to me that DNET is a more reasonable con-
tender for truth than many popular normative views (I leave it to the reader
to fill in examples), andmy impression is that a significant number of philos-
ophers accept something like it (though, by self-selection, few of these are
normative ethicists). It combines two widely held views in physicalism and
flatworldism, and draws a plausible implication from the conjunction of
these views.5 I will assume, then, that DNET is plausible enough, as nihilistic
theories go, to merit some investigation.6
Now, Ross’s argument suggests that nomatter how highmy confidence in
a nihilistic theory like DNET, I should nevertheless accept a second-order
dominance principle like GDoT*.7 The problem is this: since GDoT*
expresses an affirmative normative proposition (a ‘should’ claim), DNET
⊢¬GDoT*. So if I accept DNETwith subjective probability p, I must assign
GDoT* a degree of belief no greater than (1 p). If p> .5, then C(GDoT*)
< .5. And, assuming that my beliefs ought to be consistent, if I believe
DNET, I ought to disbelieve GDoT*.8 But how can it be rational, let alone
rationally required, to act on a principle that I regard as more likely false
than true, or that I believe to be false?
It seems to me that the solution to this undermining worry, if there is one,
must involve taking the relevant principle of rational requirement – a
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dominance principle like GDoT* or some stronger principle from which it
can be derived – to have ‘external’ normative force, in the sense given by
Weatherson (2014). An external norm is one to which an agent is subject
regardless of her beliefs and evidence, i.e. even if she justifiably rejects that
norm. Weatherson argues that unless at least some normative principle
has this sort of external force, we are facedwith a vicious regress: if any norm
is only incumbent on me to the extent that I believe it, then whenever I am
uncertain of the correctness of some norm, I must find some higher-order
norm that tells me how to act in light of my uncertainty. But since, plausibly,
a rational agent will be at least a little uncertain about any proposed norm,
including higher-order norms of choice under normative uncertainty, this
commits her to considering an infinite hierarchy of higher-order norms in
order to arrive at any rationally guided decision (Weatherson, 2014,
pp. 155–6).
The escape from this regress, plausibly, is to suggest that there is at least
one norm on which it is rational – indeed, rationally required – for an agent
to act, regardless of her beliefs with respect to that norm. One candidate for
such a regress-stopping, external norm is the requirement that agents choose
options with maximal expected choiceworthiness.9 Since maximizing
expected choiceworthiness implies GDoT* as a limiting case, this would
allow the dominance argument for rejecting nihilism to avoid the threat of
undermining: it would still be rational for an agent to act as GDoT* pre-
scribes, even if she rationally disbelieves GDoT*.10
Whether we should be comfortable with the notion of belief-independent
rational requirements, and what the content of those requirements might be,
is too large a question to resolve here. But we will return to the challenge of
undermining when it re-arises in the context of the dominance argument for
rejecting supererogationism. There I will argue that the versions of
supererogationism that threaten to undermine the relevant dominance prin-
ciples are less plausible than the corresponding versions of nihilism, and
hence that the issue of normative externalism is at least less urgent in this
context.
3. Supererogation
Let’s turn, then, to the case of supererogation. In the opening section of the
article, I suggested the following: When an agent A must choose between
options O and P, where O is certainly either obligatory or supererogatory
andP is certainly either forbidden ormerely-permissible, she is rationally re-
quired to choose O over P, despite having some (perhaps quite high) degree
of belief that P is objectively permissible. (As we will see, this simple claim
will have to be sharpened and qualified before it takes its final form, given
at the end of §4.) Paralleling – or rather, parroting – Ross, an initial
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argument for this claim can be put like this: Call the moral theory according
to which O is objectively morally required TR and the theory according to
which it is merely supererogatoryTS. According toTR,A is morally required
to choose O and forbidden to choose P, so A’s credence in TR certainly
seems to give her pro tanto subjective reason to choose O.11 The only way
this could fail to be the most rational option would be if A’s credence in
TS gave her sufficiently strong reason to chooseP instead ofO. But although
TS implies that it is permissible to chooseP, it does not imply that it would be
better to choose P than to chooseO. At most, it implies that the two options
are equally choiceworthy. Hence the pro tanto subjective reason to chooseO
is left unopposed, and so this is the rational option.
3.1. ‘ALL-THINGS-CONSIDERED’ SUPEREROGATION
This argument crucially assumes that, according to the supererogationist
theory TS, A has equal or greater all-things-considered reason to choose
the supererogatory option O as to choose the merely-permissible option P.
Let’s call option OS morally supererogatory iff for some alternative option
OP,OS is morally better thanOP, butOP is morally permissible; and let’s call
OS all-things-considered supererogatory iff for some alternative option OP,
OS is better than OP all-things-considered (that is, supported by stronger
all-things-considered reasons) but OP is still all-things-considered permissi-
ble (that is, permissible as a matter of objective rationality). In these terms,
then, the dominance argument for rejecting supererogationism assumes that
we are dealing with a case of all-things-considered supererogation. The argu-
ment will be practically interesting, therefore, only if plausible versions of
supererogationism do in fact regard many, most, or all ordinary cases of
supererogatory behavior as cases of all-things-considered, and not merely
moral, supererogation.12
This claim is prima facie plausible when we reflect on paradigm cases of
supererogation, like donating a moderately substantial portion of one’s
income to charity. Even if we regard such actions as merely supererogatory,
we do not regard an agent who performs them as acting irrationality, con-
trary to the all-things-considered balance of reasons. We can of course
describe cases where we might be inclined to say that, although an agent
has acted well from the moral point of view, she has acted on comparatively
weak moral reasons and against stronger prudential reasons, and therefore
has acted irrationally overall: think of Ned and Maude Flanders sending a
once-disheveled stranger off in Ned’s best suit, with the promise to sleep
on card tables if he ever wants the use of their master bedroom.13 But such
cases go well beyond ordinary acts of supererogatory altruism, and our atti-
tude toward them is quite different from our attitude toward, say, someone
who donates five percent of her weekly paycheck to GiveDirectly. Unlike
the absurd self-abnegation of the Flanders family, common sense regards
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these more reasonable forms of altruism as admirable and praiseworthy, not
just from a moral point of view, but simpliciter.14 Though many of us judge
that even moderate altruism (e.g. at the 5% level) is supererogatory rather
than obligatory, it is hard to imagine that any plausible theory of all-
things-considered objective reasons (so long as it incorporates non-egoistic
moral considerations at all) will judge that we have less overall reason for
making such sacrifices, when they will greatly improve the lives of the very
badly off, than we have for spending the money on ourselves.
One might think, however, that this must be a mischaracterization of our
commonsense judgments, since the notion of all-things-considered superero-
gation is self-evidently and intolerably paradoxical: if rationality always
requires us to choose the option that is supported by the strongest all-
things-considered reasons, then the definition of all-things-considered super-
erogatory options as more strongly supported by reasons and yet rationally
optional is a simple contradiction in terms, and so cannot be what is posited
(even in some cases) by plausible supererogationist moral theories.
There are a great many proposals in the literature that aim to resolve this
‘paradox of supererogation’ and render the notion of the supererogatory
coherent with a general theory of rationality. Fortunately, most of these pro-
posals are consistent with if not actively supportive of the commonsense
judgment that ordinary supererogatory acts are better and more admirable
than their merely-permissible alternatives, not just from the moral point of
view, but simpliciter. Portmore (2008), for instance, considers five possible
ways of understanding supererogation as part of a general theory of rational
options, several of which allow us to make sense of the idea of all-
things-considered supererogation. Specifically, we may understand all-
things-considered supererogation in terms of a satisficing conception of
rationality (that treats themerely-permissible alternative to a supererogatory
act as rationally permissible because itmeets some satisficing threshold, even
though there is stronger overall reason to perform the supererogatory act); in
terms of a distinction between the justifying strength and requiring strength
of reasons (according to which the reasons that make the supererogatory
option better supported by reasons overall nevertheless lack the requiring
strength to produce a rational (or moral) requirement)15; or in terms of
imperfect reasons (which, in supporting the supererogatory act, make it at
least as rational all-things-considered as any alternative, but do not generate
a rational requirement insofar as they can be satisfied by the agent
performing other morally good acts in other circumstances).16 In a similar
vein, Raz (1975) proposes to understand supererogation in terms of what
he calls ‘exclusionary permissions,’ which empower an agent to set aside
or exclude the reasons that, on balance, favor a particular course of action.17
Finally, Urmson’s classic article in defense of supererogation (Urmson,
1958) proposes that supererogatory acts be understood as differing from acts
of moral obligation simply in that the difficulty of complying with the more
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demanding principles of supererogatory moral behavior means that requir-
ing such behavior of one another, treating supererogatory acts as obligatory
under our shared moral scheme, is likely to undermine the normative force
of moral requirements in general to an extent that outweighs any potential
social gains from compliance. On this sort of broadly pragmatic understand-
ing of supererogation there is, likewise, no difficulty in the idea that many if
not all supererogatory acts are at least as strongly supported by all-things-
considered reasons as their merely-permissible alternatives.
To come at the point from the opposite direction, there are just three pos-
sible understandings of supererogation with which the argument in the pre-
ceding section is incompatible. For ordinary cases of a putatively
supererogatory option OS and a merely permissible alternative OP, in
claiming that the all-things-considered reasons to perform OS are equal to
or stronger than all-things-considered reasons to performOP, I have thereby
denied that (a) there is greater reason to performOP than to performOS, that
(b) the reasons favoring the two options are incomparable, or that (c) the rea-
sons favoring the two options are on a par (a fourth relation of evaluative
comparison, supplementing the traditional trichotomy of better/worse/
equal, proposed and defended by Ruth Chang, e.g. in Chang (1997). (I must
deny (b) and (c) as well as (a) in order to get by on a dominance principle that
avoids MacAskill’s cyclicity problem, as we will see in the next section.)
The first of these possibilities, that supererogatory acts are generally
opposed by the balance of all-things-considered reasons, is strongly
contradicted by our commonsense evaluative judgments, and has not found
advocates in the philosophical literature.18 The second possibility, that of
incomparability, is likewise highly implausible, since an enormous number
of our everyday moral judgments presuppose comparability between the
sort of altruistic reasons that commonly favor supererogatory acts and the
sort of prudential reasons that oppose them. For instance, the judgments
on the one hand that one has stronger reason to save the drowning child
in Singer’s pond than to preserve one’s new pair of shoes (Singer, 1972),
and on the other hand that Ned Flanders acts unreasonably in sacrificing
his every personal interest for the sake of whatever needy stranger lands
on his doorstep, both indicate that moral and nonmoral reasons are far from
incomparable.
The most plausible understanding of supererogation that my argument
must exclude, then, is one that draws on the notion of parity. On such an
understanding, the strength of all-things-considered reasons for choosing
some supererogatory option OS is neither greater than, nor less than, nor
equal to the strength of all-things-considered reasons for choosing some
alternative OP, but a sufficient strengthening or weakening of the reasons
on either side (for instance, an increase in the good that might be done for
others by, or in the personal costs of, performing OS) would generate a def-
inite inequality, making one option more choiceworthy overall.
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It seems to me, however, that this parity-based account of supererogation
is still inconsistent with our ordinary attitudes toward supererogatory acts.
Parity implies a kind of symmetry between options: Neither option is better
than the other, and either option could come to be better by the addition of
reasons in its favor, or the subtraction of reasons for its alternative. But our
normal attitudes toward the agent who gives more of her income to charity
than morality strictly requires do not reflect such a symmetry: our admira-
tion for her willingness to forgo creature comforts for the sake of others in
greater need is not mirrored by a deprecating judgment that she is somewhat
soft-headed or imprudent, nor by an equal admiration for the steely-eyed
prudence of her colleague who only ever gives the morally obligatory mini-
mum. Again, we view the agent who acts supererogatorily as having acted
well and admirably, not simply from one point of view among many, but
simpliciter.
It seems to me, then, that the most plausible understandings of superero-
gation will not treat (typical) supererogatory options as on a par with,
incomparable with, or less overall choiceworthy than their merely permissi-
ble alternatives. Rather, they will endorse all-things-considered supereroga-
tion, and regard most ordinary supererogatory options as more overall
choiceworthy than their alternatives, though not all-things-considered
required or obligatory. This gives the dominance argument for rejecting
supererogationism at least prima facie plausibility.
4. Rejecting supererogationism: cyclicity and undermining
Revealingly, however, the anti-supererogationist application of dominance
reasoning faces a pair of objections that closely parallel the objections to
Ross’s anti-nihilistic argument discussed in §2.
4.1. CYCLICITY AND SUPEREROGATION
MacAskill’s cyclicity worry, remember, arises insofar as nihilistic theories
are construed as treating any two options as incomparable in terms of
objective choiceworthiness. An analogous worry arises for the anti-
supererogationist argument insofar as supererogation is construed as a
matter of either incomparability or parity between supererogatory and
merely permissible options. Suppose, for instance, I have some credence in
a theory according to which the option of donating $500 to GiveDirectly
is neither more, nor less, nor equally as choiceworthy as the option of buying
a newTV (i.e. the two options are either incomparable or on a par) and some
credence in a theory according to which I am obligated to donate to
GiveDirectly. Then the principles GDoT and GDoT* will be inapplicable
and will not generate a dominance argument for donating to GiveDirectly.
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The principle DoT will generate such an argument, but at the cost of prefer-
ence cycles, as we saw in §2.
How much does a restriction to acyclic principles like GDoT* limit the
anti-supererogationist argument? One the one hand, we have just seen
reasons why the problematic theories of supererogation as incomparability
or parity are implausible. On the other hand, to whatever extent these
versions of supererogationism do seem plausible to a particular agent, there
is no easy way of saving the dominance argument against supererogation as
there is with nihilism. A normative theory that regards the options of buying
a new TV and donating toGiveDirectly as all-things-considered incompara-
ble does not treat these options as equally choiceworthy even in the ‘nega-
tive’ sense of equality described in §2.1, the sense in which nihilistic
theories do necessarily regard any two options as equally choiceworthy.
Thus, if an agent does have positive credence that these options are overall
incomparable or on a par, dominance reasoning alone cannot generate a
rational requirement to perform the morally safe option of giving to charity,
on pain of inviting cyclicity.
4.2. UNDERMINING AND SUPEREROGATION
But just as the greatest worry for Ross’s anti-nihilistic argument is that
certain forms of nihilism will undermine the very dominance principles on
which it depends, so the greatest worry about the anti-supererogationist
argument is that certain forms of supererogationism will undermine those
same principles – albeit more subtly than radical skeptical theories like
DNET.
One way this might happen is if the same arguments that support the
existence of first-order supererogation – in particular, arguments from
demandingness – can be simply re-run as objections to dominance principles
like GDoT*: that is, GDoT* should be rejected, just like maximizing utili-
tarianism, because the demands it places on moral agents are excessive.
But this line of argument is unconvincing for at least two reasons. First, even
if one thinks it plausible that principles of morality must conform to a
requirement of undemandingness, it is much harder to see why principles
of rationality like GDoT* should conform to such a requirement. Morality,
perhaps, is a human practice that must be designed to accommodate human
weakness and imperfection. But the canons of rationality derive from more
abstract standards of consistency or coherence that are not obviously sensi-
tive to such pragmatic concerns. Second, appeals to arguments for first-or-
der supererogationism are question-begging, or something very much like
it, when our goal is to formulate principles for choice under conditions of
first-order normative uncertainty, where one is inter alia uncertain about
the soundness of those very arguments. That is to say, the conditional claim
that a ‘second-order’ theory of rational choice under moral uncertainty
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should be rejected if it is highly demanding is much less plausible than the
conditional claim that a ‘first-order’ moral theory should be rejected if it is
highly demanding, because the former conditional would generate illicit ‘up-
ward dependence’ of principles for choice under moral uncertainty on the
very first-order moral questions we are uncertain about.
But there is another, more difficult way in which the undermining worry
can arise. To see it, we must introduce a further distinction among concep-
tions of supererogation, at a somewhat higher level of generality than the
distinctions discussed in the last section. Suppose we accept the existence
of all-things-considered supererogation, i.e. of option-pairs OS andOP such
that OS is more all-things-considered choiceworthy than OP, but OP is nev-
ertheless all-things-considered permissible. Presumably we would like to
hold that an agent who is certain that OS is supererogatory in this sense is
rationally permitted to choose OP (i.e. permitted as a matter of subjective
as well as objective rationality). There are, it seems to me, two broad ways
to make sense of this.
First, suppose one accepts the following two intuitively appealing prin-
ciples: (i) an agent is always rationally required to do what she has most
subjective reason to do and (ii) an agent’s subjective reasons derive from
her beliefs about her objective reasons – more specifically, that belief in
an objective reason of a given strength gives rise to a subjective reason
of proportionate strength. Then the most natural way of understanding
all-things-considered supererogation is to suppose that, although there is
more objective reason available to support the supererogatory option
OS, some of the reasons that favor OS are of a sort that the agent has
the power to set aside or eliminate: ‘justifying’ or ‘enticing’ reasons,
imperfect reasons, or reasons that come along with exclusionary permis-
sions. That is, the agent is rationally permitted to perform OP, according
to the supererogationist theory, because she has the power to alter the
initial balance of objective reasons by setting aside certain optional rea-
sons, and thereby to alter the balance of subjective reasons as well in
favor of OP.
19 Since this approach is exemplified by the idea of exclu-
sionary permissions, let’s call it the ‘exclusionary conception of superero-
gation’ (ECS).
The alternative, it seems to me, is to deny (i) and hold that supererogation
arises because, in a certain class of cases, agents are rationally permitted to
act against the balance of subjective reasons. That is, one is rationally per-
mitted to choose OP even though one has more subjective reason to choose
OS. Since this approach is exemplified by understandings of supererogation
in terms of a satisficing conception of subjective rationality, let’s call it the
‘satisficing conception of supererogation’ (SCS).
Just as DNET posed an undermining threat to the dominance argument
for rejecting nihilism, so SCS poses an undermining threat to the dominance
argument for rejecting supererogationism.20 To make this threat concrete,
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suppose that I have .6 credence in a version of SCS that implies the following
principle.
Egoistic Permissions Principle (EPP) – An agent is always rationally permitted to choose the
option that is prudentially best in expectation, out of those options in a given choice situation
that violate no moral constraint (e.g. against killing the innocent, breaking a promise, etc.), even
when there is greater all-things-considered subjective reason for her to choose some other option.
Just as in §2.2 we saw that DNET ⊢ ¬GDoT*, so here EPP ⊢ ¬GDoT*.
For consider a situation in which I can decide to spend some money harm-
lessly on myself or donate that money to charity, and in which I divide my
beliefs between a moral theory on which donating the money is obligatory
and one on which donating the money is supererogatory. In this situation,
GDoT* implies that I am rationally required to donate the money, while
EPP implies that I am not. Just as with DNET, then, it would seem that
if I accept EPP with subjective probability p, I must assign GDoT* a degree
of belief less than or equal to (1  p); that if p > .5, then C(GDoT*) < .5,
and that if I believe EPP, I must disbelieve GDoT*. So again we may ask:
how can I be subject to the rational requirements of a principle, GDoT*,
that I regard (justifiably, we may stipulate) as more likely false than true?
This undermining worry can bemitigated in several ways. First, of course,
there remains the option of taking a principle like GDoT*, or some stronger
principle fromwhich it derives, to have belief-independent rational requiring
force. Thus, we might say that, even if I justifiably believe that I am not
rationally required to perform the potentially-obligatory option O because
I have greater than .5 credence in a principle like EPP, I can nevertheless
be so required.
But moreover, there is reason to think that the versions of SCS that under-
mine dominance principles like GDoT* are uniquely implausible, indeed
more implausible than undermining forms of nihilism like DNET. It strikes
me as a basic conceptual truth that I am rationally required to do what I
have most subjective reason to do. To think otherwise is to multiply basic
normative concepts beyond necessity, allowing the concept of rational
requirement to float free of the concept of subjective reasons. And as I sug-
gested above, the sort of demandingness argument that might support a
satisficing conception of rationality in the context of potentially-supererog-
atory acts seemsmuchmore plausible in the domain of first-order normative
ethics than in the domain of rationality.21 It is much more plausible, then, to
posit the existence of certain objective reasons that I have the power to set
aside or exclude from consideration, such that they do not generate subjec-
tive reasons in the first place, than to hold that I can simply ignore the bal-
ance of subjective reasons I do have.
Nevertheless, SCS does pose an undermining threat to the dominance
argument for rejecting supererogationism, for an agent who assigns the
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majority of her credence to this version of supererogationism, and if we
deny that a principle like GDoT* has belief-independent normative force.
But what about ECS, the rival conception of supererogation according to
which an agent can alter the initial balance of reasons so that she no lon-
ger has all-things-considered subjective reason to choose the supereroga-
tory option? This seems to me the most plausible way of understanding
supererogation, but if so, it raises an interesting complication for the
dominance argument for rejecting supererogationism. It seems plausible
to suppose, on this conception, that a fully rational agent exercises her
power to alter the balance of reasons in favor of the merely permissible
option iff she actually chooses the merely permissible option: that is to
say, it seems at least irrational if not simply inconceivable for an agent
who has the power to alter the balance of reasons in favor of a
merely-permissible option to choose that option but fail to alter the bal-
ance of reasons in its favor, or to so alter the balance of reasons (setting
certain moral reasons aside) but then choose the supererogatory option
anyway. Indeed, by what means could an agent alter the balance of rea-
sons to favor the merely-permissible option, other than by making a
rational choice of that option?22
If this is so, then ECS treats cases of supererogation as exhibiting a kind of
extreme act-state dependence: an agentAwho is certain of ECS, and certain
as she chooses between options O and P that O is supererogatory and P is
merely-permissible, will be certain that whichever option she chooses will
be the one favored by the balance of reasons. If she is exactly .6 confident
that she will chooseP, then she is exactly .6 confident that the balance of rea-
sons will, in the end, turn out to favor P.23 So, ifA is not certain that she will
choose O, then she is not certain that the balance of reasons at the time she
makes her choice will not favor P, and so it looks as if dominance reasoning
cannot serve to eliminate P from consideration.
But there is something intuitively wrong with this line of reasoning: for
although A is not certain that her reasons to choose O will turn out to be
equal to or greater than her reasons to choose P, she is certain that if she
chooses O, then there will be equal or greater reason to choose O – indeed,
she is specifically certain that there will be greater reason. If she is certain
that her supererogationist theory is right, then she has the same certainty
about P, i.e. that conditional on her choosing P, P is the option favored
by the balance of reasons. But if she has some degree of belief in a more rig-
orous moral theory according to which O is obligatory, i.e. on which she
lacks the power to alter the balance of reasons in favor of P, then she can
no longer have this certainty that if she chooses P, P will be the option most
supported by her reasons. This creates an asymmetry in favor of O that
seems to make O the most rational option.
And indeed, a slight reframing of the dominance principle GDoT* that
accounts for the problem of act-state dependence allows us to accommodate
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this intuition. The fully precise way of expressing the idea of dominance rea-
soning over moral theories, it seems to me, is as follows.
Final Dominance over Theories (FDoT) – If (i) every theory in which an agent A has positive cre-
dence implies that, conditional on her choosing option O, she has equal* or greater subjective
reason to choose O as to choose P, (ii) one or more theories in which she has positive credence
imply that, conditional on her choosingO, she has greater subjective reason to chooseO than to
choose P, and (iii) one or more theories in which she has positive credence imply that, condi-
tional on her choosing P, she has greater subjective reason to choose O than to choose P, then
A is rationally prohibited from choosing P.
If some principle like FDoT is correct, that allows dominance reasoning to
accommodate the sort of act-state dependence generated by exclusionary
permissions, then the dominance strategy will succeed against ECS versions
of supererogationism. To avoid the undermining problem, therefore, it is
only required that the agent have less than .5 credence in the less plausible
satisficing conception of supererogation, or that the relevant dominance
principles have belief-independent normative force.24
Having defended the notion of all-things-considered supererogation and
considered the cyclicity and undermining challenges in this new context,
we can now state the final conclusion of the dominance argument for
rejecting supererogationism as follows: For any agent A, if either (i) a dom-
inance principle like FDoT has external normative force (and is thus incum-
bent on A regardless of her normative beliefs) or (ii) A has less than .5
credence in an SCS version of supererogationism that would undermine
such a dominance principle, then whenever, given options O and P, A is
certain that O is either obligatory or all-things-considered supererogatory
(and, correspondingly, that P is either prohibited or merely permissible),
but uncertain which, A is rationally required to choose O and prohibited
from choosing P. The practical scope of this conclusion will depend mainly
on how often an agent is justified is being certain that some practical option
is either all-things-considered supererogatory or obligatory. I turn to this
issue in the next section, and consider some important practical cases to
which the anti-supererogationist argument is plausibly applicable.
5. Practical upshots
To the extent that the anti-supererogationist argument is effective, it sheds
new light on some contested practical questions concerning the ethics of phi-
lanthropy. Suppose you are a typical member of the middle class in the
developed world, and that on careful examination of the available evidence
you judge that donating to well-chosen charities can save a life in expecta-
tion at a cost on the order of a few thousand dollars.25 The upshot of a
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dominance principle like FDoT seems to be that you are rationally required
to donate a substantial portion of your income to such charities, even if you
think that such donations are probably supererogatory.More specifically, as
per FDoT, you are rationally required to give at least to the point at which
you judge that, by givingmore, youmight no longer be acting for the best, all
things considered. In contrast to Peter Singer’s famous injunction to ‘give to
the point of marginal utility’ (Singer, 1972), we might say that you are
required (at least) to give ‘to the point of all-things-considered uncertainty.’
If you are not yet at this point, then you do not risk acting contrary to the
overall balance of reasons by giving another dollar to charity. But if you
keep the dollar, you do run such a risk, since have some credence that your
all-things-considered objective reasons require you to donate. You may
believe, with great confidence, that your donation is objectively supereroga-
tory, but there is no (overall) harm done by performing a supererogatory
action on the grounds that it might be obligatory, while there is (overall)
harm done by refraining from an objectively obligatory action on the
grounds that it might be supererogatory. The latter is a risk to be avoided,
the former is not.
Giving to the point of all-things-considered uncertainty will generally be
quite a bit less demanding than giving to the point of marginal utility. But
just where is the point of all-things-considered uncertainty, for a typical
well-off agent? Here intuitions will no doubt diverge. We can easily imagine
cases where any reasonable agent would be at least a little uncertain whether
she is acting for the best, all things considered, especially where there are
competing moral considerations in play: moving your family into a hovel
in order to squeeze more deworming money out of your Wall Street pay-
check, for instance, might well be an overall mistake. Of course, this risk
of wrongdoing against your family might be outweighed by the risk of
wronging the least well off by not giving to the point of marginal utility,
but it might not be – dominance reasoning alone cannot speak to this ques-
tion. In any case, it should be readily conceded that there is a point some-
where before the point of marginal utility at which the possibility of
stronger countervailing obligations or non-moral reasons comes into play,
and dominance reasoning can go no further.
Still, common sense suggests that few First Worlders are presently in any
danger of going past this point. Is there a significant risk that a typical
American would violate a moral obligation, or otherwise act against the
overall balance of reasons, by deciding that she and her family should live
on $50,000 rather than $60,000 per year, if by this sacrifice they could save
the equivalent of three lives every year in expectation? Even here, perhaps,
intuitions may diverge. But I imagine no one will think that an agent in this
position who donated, say, $1000 a year to charity would be acting for the
worse all things considered. And so by the above reasoning, this much at
least is rationally required.
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More clearly, perhaps, the dominance argument holds implications for
where one’s charitable efforts should be directed. Suppose that a billionaire
philanthropist every year makes a $1,000,000 donation to the local art
museum. One year, an admirable friend suggests to her that this money
would be better spent supporting some life-saving health initiative in the
developing world. Here, I don’t think reasonable intuitions can diverge. It
seems simply obvious that, between the options of donating amillion dollars
to the art museum and donating a million dollars to the health initiative,
there is more all-things-considered reason to choose the latter, and the for-
mer option can be permissible only if the latter is supererogatory. Put
another way, it is extremely implausible that our imagined agent would vio-
late a moral obligation or otherwise act for the worse by choosing to support
the health initiative instead of the museum. In so doing, she might deprive
the local museum-going public of the chance to feign enjoyment of onemore
Jackson Pollock canvas, but it is quite hard to believe that her obligations in
this respect outweigh her obligations to the global poor.
Here, then, is a straightforward practical conclusion: when an agent is
confident that it is all-things-considered permissible for her to devote certain
resources (time, money, etc.) to philanthropic endeavors, and has no reason
to think herself under any other obligation to support some specific philan-
thropic endeavor (e.g. by having promised themoney to the art museum), the
possible obligation to support efficient endeavors – those that do the most
good per dollar spent – is enough to generate a rational requirement that
she choose these efficient endeavors over their less efficient alternatives.26
Rejecting supererogationism may have practical consequences in other
domains as well. For instance, an agent might be convinced that non-human
animals have enough moral standing that vegetarianism is at least as
choiceworthy, all things considered, as meat consumption, and yet be unsure
whether vegetarianism is morally required or supererogatory. Likewise, a
citizen of a democratic society might be certain that she has at least as much
overall reason to vote as to stay home on election day, and yet be unsure
whether voting is morally required or supererogatory. For such agents, the
dominance argument implies that they are rationally required to choose
the morally safe option (vegetarianism or voting, respectively).
A common theme among the consequences of rejecting supererogationism
– favoring altruism and philanthropy in general, efficient philanthropy in
particular, and increased regard for potential moral subjects like non-human
animals – is their broadly utilitarian character. The effect of rejecting
supererogationism is largely pro-utilitarian, I suspect, because utilitarian the-
ories are the only plausible moral theories that are totalizing, in the sense of
rendering every or nearly every choice a matter of moral obligation. Thus,
wherever a potentially obligatory action fails to maximize utility, it is poten-
tially forbidden, i.e. there is a possible contrary objective obligation to coun-
terbalance it (even if this possible obligation is outweighed in the last analysis)
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– so for any agent who has positive credence in classical utilitarianism, dom-
inance reasoning cannot imply a rational requirement to choose anynon-util-
ity-maximizing course of action. By contrast, we often face choices where the
only potentialmoral obligation onewayor the other is that implied byamax-
imizing utilitarian theory, and in these cases dominance reasoning suggests
that we are often rationally required to meet the utilitarian demand.
6. Conclusion
I have argued that, when an agent is uncertain whether some practical
option is obligatory or all-things-considered supererogatory, even if she
thinks it is most likely supererogatory, she may nevertheless be rationally
required to choose that option. And I have argued that, according to the
most plausible forms of supererogationism, ordinary cases of moral superer-
ogation are also cases of all-things-considered supererogation. The major
qualification that must be added to these conclusions, as we have seen, is
that the agent must not have credence greater than .5 in satisficing versions
of supererogationism that endorse strongly permissive principles like EPP –
that is, unless it turns out that the normative force of dominance principles
like GDoT* or FDoT is simply independent of the agent’s beliefs. But
because principles like EPP are implausible – and less plausible, I think, than
the versions of nihilism that threaten to undermine Ross’s argument – it
seems to me that the dominance argument for rejecting supererogationism
is on a surer footing than the dominance argument for rejecting nihilism.
The practical scope of the anti-supererogationist argument depends
mainly on how often we can be certain that some potentially-supererogatory
option is at least as objectively choiceworthy as its less morally attractive
alternative, e.g., that donating to charity is at least as choiceworthy as spend-
ing the same money on luxury goods for myself. If one is disposed to think
that we should assign positive credence, however slight, to every or nearly
every proposition, then of course dominance principles will have no scope
at all for application. But this limitation of dominance reasoning is no more
operative in the context ofmoral uncertainty than in the context of empirical
uncertainty – if anything, less so, since it seems more plausible that we
should always have positive credence in all empirical propositions than that
we should always have positive credence in all moral propositions.
Dominance principles in their native, game-theoretic context depend for
their relevance on an idealized assumption of partial certainty that rarely if
ever describes our real choices.27
In the moral as in the empirical domain, then, statewise dominance princi-
ples might be best understood as idealized limiting cases of some stronger
principle, like first-order stochastic dominance or expected value maximiza-
tion. That is, if I have some substantial positive credence that O is more
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choiceworthy than P, then as my credence that P is more choiceworthy than
O approaches zero, it becomes increasingly certain that O has higher
expected value and is the more rational choice. Statewise dominance reason-
ing, onemight think, is just a useful simplification of this sort of situation.28 If
this way of thinking about dominance reasoning is correct, however, then the
practical relevance of dominance arguments in the context of moral
uncertainty will depend on the success of some more ambitious and general
(e.g. expectational) theory of rational choice under moral uncertainty.29
This is just one of several relevant open problems that I have left unad-
dressed, or only partially addressed, in this article.What is the strongest, fully
precisified principle of dominance reasoning under normative uncertainty
(e.g., how should we individuate ‘normative theories’ for purposes of domi-
nance reasoning?), andwhat (if any)more general theory of decision-making
under normative uncertainty does this principle derive from? Does either the
dominance principle or the more general theory have belief-independent
normative force, or is it incumbent on agents only to the extent that they
believe it? And how will the true account of decision-making under
normative uncertainty interact with each of the various, structurally diverse
first-order normative theories that have proposed to accommodate superer-
ogation (and other related forms of normative permissiveness, e.g. the ‘small
improvements’ cases that motivate the literature on parity)? But although
there is a great deal more to be said, I hope to have at least drawn attention
to a previously neglected context in which considerations of normative
uncertainty may prove practically significant. Even if I incline toward a nor-
mative worldview that givesme broad permission to pursuemy own interests
or projects at the expense of the greater good, I should be conscious of the
possibility that I am subject to more stringent moral obligations, and of the
risk that I violatemy obligations by acting inways that strikeme as probably





1 These are of course potentially distinct lines of argument, though closely related since to
say that optionO dominates an alternativeP is just to say that there is some risk of acting for the
worse by choosing P but no such risk in choosingO. My focus in this article, however, will be on
the first formulation, the argument from dominance. Whether there is, say, a principle to the
effect that ceteris paribus one ought not risk violating a moral obligation, that might stand even
if the relevant dominance principles fall, is a question I will not take up.
2 Throughout the article, I will use ‘choiceworthy’ just tomean ‘supported by objective rea-
sons,’ such that to call one option more choiceworthy than another is to say that it is supported
by stronger objective reasons.
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3 I borrow this term from Karen Bennett (2011).
4 The name I have given this view is not meant to imply an attribution to Democritus.
But the spirit of the view is neatly captured by his famous adage: ‘By convention sweet and
by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention color; but in
reality atoms and void’ (Taylor, 1999). The DNETist just adds to this list: ‘by convention
right, by convention wrong, by convention rational, by convention irrational…but still, just
atoms and void.’
5 Of course, even if one accepts physicalism and flatworldism, one might still try to make
normative propositions true by letting atoms and void alone serve as their truthmakers. This
could be done by paraphrasing away existential claims concerning reasons and the like (‘atoms
arranged reason-wise,’ perhaps), by eschewing such talk entirely, or by defending it as
ineliminable but ontologically non-committing. Since my goal is not to defend DNET, I won’t
attempt to assess these strategies individually. I do, however, find them at least mildly implausi-
ble. Suffice it to say that normativity in the most interesting sense (features of the world that
count in favor of actions and make our actions matter) must be something that carves the world
at a fairly fundamental joint, and analyses of normative concepts that make them logically or
conceptually (rather than metaphysically) supervenient on atoms and void appear to carve no
such joint.
6 In a footnote, Ross attempts to avoid the undermining worry by fiat, restricting the scope
of his argument to ‘a kind of nihilism that denies that there are any objective reasons for action
but that concedes that if one held that there were such reasons, then it would be subjectively
rational to act in accordance with them’ (Ross, 2006b, p. 749n). In fact, Ross’s stipulation must
go a bit further than this, since his dominance argument is meant to apply not only to agents who
hold (i.e. fully believe) that there are objective reasons for action but to any agent who has pos-
itive degree of belief that there are such reasons. Thus, the version of nihilism to which Ross re-
stricts his attention must deny that there are any objective reasons for action but also affirm that
there are subjective reasons for action, and that any agent with non-zero credence in the existence
of objective reasons has subjective reasons. There is a significant prima facie tension, however,
between denying the existence of all objective reasons and asserting the existence of subjective
reasons, and Ross gives no argument that plausible nihilistic theories should be understood in
this way. So it seems that this self-imposed restriction would limit the scope of Ross’s argument
to a relatively implausible subset of nihilistic theories.
7 A variety of other dominance-like principles could be offered to facilitate Ross’s argu-
ment. MacAskill considers a second principle, suggested by Ross, called ‘Modified Dominance
over Theories’ (MDoT) that achieves the same result (MacAskill, 2013, p. 515). Weatherson
considers a dominance-like principle he calls ‘ProbWrong,’ then suggests a schematic version
called ‘General Principle’ that could be filled in by various evaluative predicates to facilitate
the anti-nihilistic argument (Weatherson, 2014, p. 146). But the undermining objection described
in this section applies equally and straightforwardly to all these principles.
8 If GDoT* is read as a material conditional, this argument becomes slightly more compli-
cated –GDoT* then is not itself an affirmative normative proposition, but implies such a prop-
osition when conjoined with empirical propositions about my credence over theories that I
presumably accept (and that I must accept, for GDoT* to apply to me and for Ross’s argument
to gain traction). But this does not affect the substance of the undermining problem: GDoT* is
still inconsistent with the conjunction of empirical facts about my credal state (which make its
antecedent true) and DNET (which makes its consequent false).
9 This principle is proposed byWedgwood (2013) as the ‘fundamental principle of rational-
ity’ and endorsed byMacAskill (2014) in the context of decision-making under normative uncer-
tainty. In ch. 7 of Tarsney (2017), I elaborateWeatherson’s regress argument for externalism and
argue that the best way of stopping the regress is to attribute external normative force either to
the principle of maximizing expected choiceworthiness or to a weaker stochastic dominance
principle. Weatherson himself prefers a view on which most or all first-order moral norms have
external force, so that an agent’s moral beliefs and uncertainties (at least about ‘thin’ moral
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properties like rightness) are generally irrelevant to what she ought to do. But the regress prob-
lem on its own does not force us to adopt this extreme form of externalism.
10 Ross himself has defended an externalist view of rational requirements (Ross, 2006a, pp.
273–7), as have Broome (2013) and Bykvist (2013), inter alia. If this externalist view is correct,
and if the relevant dominance principles are among the belief-independent requirements of ratio-
nality, then Ross has the resources to avoid the undermining problem.
11 I assume here, and throughout the article, that if A is morally obligated to chooseO then
she has most all-things-considered objective reason to choose O. This assumption is widely
accepted, but not entirely uncontroversial – it is denied, for instance, by Foot (1972). For a recent
defense, see Portmore (2011, pp. 38–51).
12 Here and elsewhere I ignore the possibility of exact equality in the strength of reasons. If a
supererogationist theory regards a supererogatory optionOS and its merely permissible alterna-
tiveOP as equally choiceworthy, all things considered, this would of course suffice for purposes
of the dominance argument. But equality of reasons is, in general, extremely fragile, being dis-
turbed by any increase or decrease in the strength of reasons favoring either option. Since it is
fragile, equality is also extremely rare. Thus, while the dominance argument is compatible with
the possibility that there is equal all-things-considered reason to performOS as to performOP, it
will far more often be the case that there is at least slightly greater reason to perform OS.
13 The Simpsons, S3 E24, ‘Brother, Can You Spare Two Dimes?’
14 Likewise, it is the Flanders-like extremes of altruism that give intuitive plausibility to
Susan Wolf’s skepticism about ‘moral saints’ (Wolf, 1982). As Wolf argues, a life of moral per-
fection may be genuinely better from the moral point of view than a more ordinary life, but
either worse or at least incomparable all-things-considered because of the nonmoral goods that
must be sacrificed in the pursuit of moral perfection. But one can grant this conclusion without
denying that some voluntary altruism in excess of the bare moral minimum may be good and
praiseworthy from an all-things-considered (and not merely a moral) point of view.
15 Horgan and Timmons, among others, have defended this understanding of supereroga-
tion: ‘What the case of Olivia suggests, then, is the idea that not all good moral reasons for an
agent to perform some action, even reasons that are plausibly considered “best,” are such as
to require that she perform that action, even prima facie. Some moral considerations clearly
do have a requiring force, but (we submit) others need not’ (Horgan and Timmons, 2010, p. 50).
16 The other two possibilities Portmore considers, drawing on the ideas of parity and incom-
parability/rough comparability between reasons respectively, are incompatible with the argu-
ment I have given, as we will see below. But, as I will argue, they are also incompatible with
our commonsense judgments of the merits of supererogatory acts.
17 ‘A person may have an exclusionary permission to perform an act even though there are
conclusive reasons for him not to perform it, provided that he is entitled not to act for those rea-
sons, to exclude them from his considerations. In other words: to say that a person is permitted
to perform an act is to say that he may perform it, i.e. that he does nothing wrong in performing
it. He is permitted to perform the act because there are no conclusive reasons against doing so or
because he may exclude such reasons from his considerations’ (Raz, 1975, p. 163).
18 Portmore has come nearer than others to defending this view, but disclaims it in Portmore
(2008, p. 382n). In rejecting this general view of supererogation, however, we need not deny that
there are some acts we might intuitively describe as supererogatory that we have most all-things-
considered reason not to perform: Think again of Ned Flanders-like extremes of altruism, and
more generally of altruistic acts that harm the agentmore than they help the beneficiary. (I thank
an anonymous reviewer for this point.)Whether we are inclined to call these acts supererogatory
is, I think, a verbal matter on which nothing of philosophical substance should turn. My central
claim is thatmost ordinary cases of behaviorwe intuitively regard asmorally supererogatory (e.g.
donating a modest portion of one’s paycheck to GiveDirectly) are also intuitively cases of all-
things-considered supererogation.
If one did take the view that, in all or some of these ordinary cases, we have more all-things-
considered reason to perform the merely permissible option rather than its supererogatory
REJECTING SUPEREROGATIONISM 619
© 2018 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly published by University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
alternative, one might still reach the same practical conclusions I defend in this article, so long as
the balance of all-things-considered reasons against the supererogatory option is slight. This con-
clusion derives prima facie support, for instance, fromRoss’s (2006a) argument that we have pro
tanto reason to reject ‘unselective’/‘top-heavy’ normative theories that regard many options as
almost-maximally good (Ross, 2006a, pp. 39–42). This might be one way of spelling out the ar-
gument from moral risk suggested in footnote 1.
19 Alternatively, one might deny the objective-subjective linkage principle (ii), and hold
instead that agents have the power, not to eliminate certain objective reasons, but rather simply
to prevent them from generating subjective reasons. As far as I can see, everything I say about
the view described in the main text will apply to this variant as well.
The idea that we can sometimes alter our reasons by an act of will is rendered plausible by
other sorts of cases where this seems to happen: for instance, when an agent forms or abandons
a plan or life project, she may be thought of as creating or eliminating reasons for herself. Super-
erogatory moral reasons, on this conception, might be thought of as reasons ‘out there’ in the
environment that an agent can, but need not, adopt as her own. For defense of the claim that
agents can have some voluntary control over their objective reasons, see the discussion of
‘will-based reasons’ in Chang (2013). (On Chang’s view, we can sometimes create reasons for
ourselves by an act of will, though in so doing we can never reverse a definite inequality in
our ‘given’ reasons. But once we accept the general idea that agents can have some voluntary
control over their objective reasons, I see no obvious reason why we shouldn’t accept that we
can sometimes exclude or eliminate non-will-based reasons by an act of will, so long as the im-
plications of the resulting theory accord with common sense.)
20 I thank Shelly Kagan for bringing this problem to my attention.
21 Another sort of argument for a satisficing conception of rationality invokes choice situa-
tions in which there are infinitely many options, none of which is maximally choiceworthy
(Landesman, 1995). But it is hard to see how a satisficing view motivated by cases of this kind
could support a theory of supererogation.
22 Thus, on the exclusionary conception of supererogation, an agent who performs amerely-
permissible option instead of its supererogatory alternative does what she has most overall rea-
son to do, having set aside her potential reasons in favor of the supererogatory option. This is
what explains why an agent who is certain thatO is supererogatory and P is merely permissible
is rationally permitted to chooseP. This raises a question, however: why, on this account, do we
not feel that such an agent merits the same sort of all-things-considered praise and admiration as
she would if she had acted supererogatorily? Perhaps because, although she does what she has
most reason to do, she does not do what she had most available reason to do. But more
importantly, we praise and admire agents who do what they have most reason to do only when
this involves some kind of difficulty. Choosing to spend $500 on a new TV rather than donating
to GiveDirectly does not require any unusual fortitude, willpower, or ability. So as in
other cases where doing what one has most reason to do is easy (e.g. depositing a paycheck in
my bank account rather than burning it), the merely-permissible choice merits neither praise
nor blame.
23 I assume that deliberation does not ‘crowd out prediction,’ i.e. that an agent can have cre-
dences concerning what her own choice will be even as she deliberates about that choice. For
defense of this view, see for instance Joyce (2002).
24 In a structural sense, therefore, versions of supererogationism on which non-moral rea-
sons are stronger than or incomparable with moral reasons pose a more substantial threat to
the dominance argument, since any positive credence in these theories will block the application
of GDoT* or FDoT. This is symptomatic of a more general worry, that the application of any
statewise dominance principle requires an unrealistic assumption of certainty and hence that
dominance reasoning will always or nearly always be derailed by small credences in recalcitrant
theories. I return to this worry in the concluding section.
25 Figures in this range are well-supported by recent research. See for example GiveWell’s
estimate of the cost-effectiveness of anti-malarial bed net distributions (GiveWell, 2013).
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26 Thus, the dominance argument for rejecting supererogationism lends support to the prac-
tical program of effective altruism, according to which our philanthropic and other altruistic ac-
tivities should aim not simply to do some good but to do the most good possible given the
resources at our disposal (MacAskill, 2015).
27 This draws attention to another point we have passed over, though I believe justifiably.
The mundane reason why I might not be certain that donating to GiveDirectly is at least as
choiceworthy as buying a new TV is that my reasons for donating to GiveDirectly depend on
the consequences of that donation, and I should plausibly have at least some credence that those
consequences will be net negative. I have been assuming so far that, for purposes of dominance
reasoning over moral theories, these empirical uncertainties can be suppressed. That is, the dom-
inance principles we have considered say roughly that if eachmoral theory to which I assign pos-
itive credence implies that my empirical-belief-relative reasons either favor optionO over option
P or are neutral between the two, then I should choose O over P. (This is accomplished, in the
dominance principles considered by MacAskill and my own elaborations of them, by talking
about what each normative theory implies about an agent’s subjective reasons.) It seems permis-
sible to reason in this way, rather than attempt the fruitless task of applying dominance princi-
ples over all maximal conjunctions of moral and non-moral possibilities, because particular
normative theories will have their own internal methods for handling empirical uncertainty,
which are oftenmuch stronger than dominance reasoning. Thus, from the standpoint of an agent
deliberating about what to do given her moral uncertainties, she can simply take it as input, for
instance, that utilitarianism assigns greater expected utility toO than to P, suppressing any fur-
ther consideration of the empirical uncertainties that contribute to the utilitarian assessment.
28 If we accept the understanding of statewise dominance as a limiting case of amore general
decision theory, alongwith the justification for suppressing empirical uncertainty suggested in the
previous footnote, then we can reformulate somewhat more strongly the conclusions reached
in last two sections. The strengthened conclusion is this: If I have credence less than .5 in a
satisficing version of supererogationism, or the relevant principles of rationality have belief-
independent normative force, then in cases where (i) I am certain or nearly certain that the true
normative theory implies that optionO is either obligatory or all-things-considered supereroga-
tory (in an empirical-belief-relative sense that allows, e.g., for substantial uncertainty about the
consequences of doing O) and (ii) I have substantial credence that O is obligatory, I am nearly
always rationally required to chooseO.
The practical scope of this strengthened conclusion, then, depends mainly on how often an
agent is justified in being nearly certain that some practical option is either all-things-considered
supererogatory or obligatory, in the appropriate empirical-belief-relative sense – for instance,
howoften a typical resident of an affluent country canbe nearly certain that, according to the true
normative theory, she has at least as much empirical-belief-relative reason (before exclusions) to
donate a given sum of money to a cost-effective charity like GiveDirectly rather than spending it
on herself or on lower-impact philanthropic causes.
It seems clear tome that agents are often in at least thismoremodest sort of epistemic position.
But somewithwhom I’ve discussed these arguments have expressed skepticism. It’s hard tomake
much progress on this pointwithout doing a lot of normative ethics, but it may be helpful, in light
of the reformulated conclusion suggested above, to consider what a few of the most widely ac-
cepted normative theories imply about the cases of moderate altruism on which I have focused,
like the choice between donating toGiveDirectly and buying a newTV.Utilitarianism and other
standard consequentialist theories, of course, imply that I have most reason to support
GiveDirectly.Kantianismholds that, in supportingGiveDirectly, I fulfill an imperfect dutyof be-
neficence, and presumably in so doing do not act againstmy all-things-considered reasons.Other
deontological theories that recognize duties of aid or beneficence will presumably say something
similar.Virtue theories and commonsensemorality areharder to pin down, but their implications
can be gauged by our ordinary attitudes toward supererogatory acts and the agents who perform
them, which I have argued consist of all-things-considered approbation. Commonsense views
may hold (depending on whose common sense they are attempting to capture) that we are often
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justified in giving extreme preference to friends and family, or to personally significant causes like
the local arts scene, but this is because common sense regards the more cost-effective alternatives
as all-things-considered supererogatory, not because it regards them asworse (or so our ordinary
attitudes suggest).The only prominent normative theories according towhichone’s empirical-be-
lief-relative reasons are against supportingGiveDirectly, as far as I can see, are egoistic theories –
either ethical egoismoranegoistic theoryof rationality according towhichoneonlyhas reason to
act altruistically insofar as it will contribute to the satisfaction of one’s desires or other motiva-
tional states. I won’t claim that no ordinary agent is ever justified in having substantial credence
in these egoistic theories, but it seems tome thatmost ordinary agents do not have substantial cre-
dence in such theories, and are justified in so distributing their credence.
29 Expectational theories of rational choice under moral or other forms of normative uncer-
tainty face a number of special challenges, in particular the need to make cardinal comparisons
between the value scales of rival normative theories. For discussion of this ‘problem of
intertheoretic value comparisons,’ see Lockhart (2000); Ross (2006a); Sepielli (2009);MacAskill
(2014); and Riedener (2015), inter alia. My own preferred approach to intertheoretic value com-
parison is outlined in Tarsney (2018), and described more fully in ch. 6 and Appendix B of
Tarsney (2017).
30 For helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article, I thank Samuel Kerstein, William
MacAskill, Dan Moller, Christopher Morris, Caleb Pickard, Douglas Portmore, Julius
Schönherr, Joshua Shepherd, several anonymous referees, and audiences at the Long Island
Philosophical Society conference, the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, and the Oxford Ap-
plied Ethics Graduate Discussion Group.
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